Under an EPS, any incumbent operator running 25 per cent of regular service miles in the city can block a mayor’s plans for its bus network or limit them. An EPS can only move ‘at the speed of the slowest’ large operator in its area.

Agreements to control frequency to reduce ‘overbussing’ on busy routes in an EPS cannot stop new operators from adding services. In these circumstances, to control frequencies so that competition does not reduce the efficiency of the wider bus network, the corridor would need to be franchised. Nottingham’s attempts to reduce the number of buses in the city centre creating congestion highlighted the limits of any partnership scheme in a deregulated environment.⁴²

Operators can agree to reduce the frequency of timetable changes under an EPS, but decisions about changes to frequencies are still in the hands of operators.

An EPS allows for multi-modal ticketing, but the incentive to compete between routes rather than complement remains.

Under an EPS, operators and mayors can work together to decide how multiple operator tickets are priced. But this is ultimately dependent on operators.

An EPS does not allow cities to directly subsidise fares for all bus users. It can specify different concession entitlements, such as for apprenticeships.

An EPS allows for the creation of common fare zones if agreed to. But prices can only go as low as the fare agreed to by the highest-cost operator.

Under an EPS there must always be a single-operator ticket price set independently by operators. The incentive remains for operators to price this relative to multi-operator tickets so that passengers avoid travelling on other operators’ services.

Under an EPS, bus operators still control farebox revenues.

Because mayors also have control of the bus network, they can be certain about how services will respond to improvements, reducing the risk of acting.

New bus lanes can be matched to higher-frequency services and lower fares. This sharpens the incentive to invest and derisks doing so. Greater Manchester’s assessment highlights the lower value for money to the city of investing in bus priority outside of franchising.⁴³

Under an EPS, the direct financial beneficiary of public investment is the incumbent private bus operator, not the city. An EPS provides a means for cities and operators to set out where their interests align and commit to improvements, but the incentives are weaker, less direct and the commitments less certain than under franchising.

An EPS requires the agreement of the operators of 75 per cent of service kilometres in the area to set binding standards. If this threshold is met then all operators must adhere to these standards and the city can enforce them by controlling bus operator registrations as the traffic commissioner.

Emissions standards of buses in London are significantly higher than in other major cities. All double-decker buses in the city centre are now lower-emission hybrid vehicles.⁴⁴ These standards are set by the mayor, rather than operators.

London has attracted operators from around the world with different experiences and methods bidding for fixed-fee contracts.

The hurdles that franchising proposals must overcome and the scope for challenge have been reduced in the Bus Services Act 2017. Bus operators must provide information on ridership and income on routes to cities to develop assessments, which are then signed off by an independent auditor. It is then up to the mayor, not the Secretary of State, to give the final go ahead. In the case of Greater Manchester, which has progressed furthest with its proposals, the mayor would have the full support of all the major parties in his ambitions to franchise its bus network.

EPSs will also see conditions and quality standards enforced on smaller existing operators. The legislation is intended to protect smaller operators but high standards open cities up to legal challenge, unless they step in to fund improvements, which would increase the up-front cost and financial risk of an EPS. Under an EPS mayors will have legal obligations to deliver major bus priority schemes to improve bus reliability that may be hindered by financial, operational or political limitations.

1. Service changes. Bigger changes to timetables and routes are likely to bring bigger risks. Mayors may choose to limit these changes to reducing inefficiencies when first moving to a franchised model, as Greater Manchester has proposed in its assessment.

2. Operator changes. Risks will increase if tenders are won by non-incumbent operators. But London’s experience shows that there are bus operators from cities around the world willing and able to handle these transitions for staff, vehicles and depots.

Cities will need to be clear on how they will de-risk entry for new entrants — ensuring sites and planning support is available for new depots, for example, will be critical.

An EPS poses a lower level of transition risk for cities as the existing operators will have co-developed the scheme.

In the West Midlands, under the existing Bus Alliance, all buses will be red with ‘Transport for the West Midlands’ branding, to inspire a similar sense of local pride that London’s red buses do in the capital. This change was announced by the mayor last year, as part of an announcement about an integrated transport network.⁴⁵

An EPS is time limited. Once it ends, operators are not limited by the provisions it contains.

Under an EPS, mayors are not directly exposed to declining finances.