The misdiagnosis of “left behind”: a political case for a city-focused Industrial Strategy
Will an Industrial Strategy that focuses on big cities fan the flames of political discontent between city and town?
Will an Industrial Strategy that focuses on big cities fan the flames of political discontent between city and town?
Will an Industrial Strategy that focuses on big cities fan the flames of political discontent between city and town? There’s certainly a widely held belief that the increase in political discontent in the last decade is in part because of some places feeling like they’ve been left behind by big cities. Such a belief has resulted in a perceived conflict between the economies of city and town, and some argue that the Government should shift their focus to towns. But Centre for Cities’ latest briefing shows this not to be the case.
It is true that cities have lower levels of discontent than their surrounding areas. Figure 1 shows the different levels of discontent proxied by the vote shares for Brexit in 2016 and for Reform UK in 2024. Populist support is higher in constituencies farther away from cities.
But looking at voting patterns alongside the access that a constituency has to the prosperity generated in a city – proxied by data on commuting to city centres – turns this on its head. Figure 2 looks at this relationship for all large cities and their surrounding hinterlands outside of the Greater South East.
It shows two things. The first is that there is a negative relationship between the two. Those constituencies that have stronger links – and so better access to the prosperity generated in large city centres – had lower vote shares for Brexit in 2016 and Reform UK in 2024.
And the second is that this patterns holds across both city and town. Levels of discontent are higher even within cities where access to higher-paid city centre jobs is more limited.
Looking at several constituencies in Manchester helps illustrate the point. Ashton-under-Lyme or Oldham, both of which have relatively few commuters, have polled higher for Brexit and Reform UK. This is not the case in places like Altrincham and Sale West, which have stronger links to jobs in the city centre. Yet all three are urban constituencies geographically close to Manchester city centre. So, it is not the status of a city, but rather the access to cities that are associated with less political discontent. Constituencies with better access to the prosperity generated in city centres have lower levels of discontent.
This makes the now well-understood problem of the underperformance of big cities outside London a political problem as well as an economic one. London’s strong performance generates a much greater amount of prosperity for those living in and around the capital. The result is that political discontent is lower both within London and surrounding it than in and around most other large cities.
So, voting for populism is not a railing against the success of large neighbouring cities. It is more likely a protest against not being able to access the too little prosperity they generate. The rise of populism has been misdiagnosed. Prosperous cities do not create “left behind” places. Underperforming cities do.
Addressing political discontent goes hand in hand with improving the economic performance of big cities. Contrary to exacerbating political divides, investing in these large cities – as both the Industrial Strategy Green Paper and the Levelling Up White Paper before it set out – should not worsen these divides. If anything, it would likely help narrow them.
The Government has the opportunity to address both the political and economic issues through an Industrial Strategy focused on big places. The economic case for a focus on big cities has long been clear. And now, so is the political case.
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