Do metro mayors need more authority over decision-making?
How are decisions are made within the existing and new MCAs and do metro mayors need more authority over decision-making?
How are decisions are made within the existing and new MCAs and do metro mayors need more authority over decision-making?
The public debate about the forthcoming English Devolution White Paper has mostly focused on what powers should be devolved and to what areas. Much less emphasis has been given to how the decisions are made within the existing and new MCAs and whether they need to change if we are to make the most of the mayoral-led model (spoiler alert: they do).
The powers of each metro mayor are set out in the devolution deal for their area, with the types and degrees of their powers varying. But the biggest distinction in how decisions are made and weight of those decisions is not between the individual metro mayors, but between the metro mayors and the Mayor of London.
In all the devolution deals to date, the metro mayor chairs the MCA’s cabinet, which is made up of the leaders of the constituent local authorities. Metro mayors must consult the combined authority cabinet on their strategies, e.g. transport, which the cabinet can reject with a two-thirds majority, and their budgets, which the cabinet can amend with a two-thirds majority. Some metro mayors have the power to create a spatial development strategy which must be unanimously approved by the cabinet. And if the mayor wants to establish a development corporation or use CPOs the local authority affected must give the mayor permission to do so.
This is unlike the situation in London. Whilst the Assembly can block some of the mayor’s decisions on strategy and funding with a two-thirds majority, the mayor can act without formal reference to the boroughs. And the decisions made by the London mayor, e.g. on planning and low emission zones, are binding on the boroughs affected.
The current decision-making arrangements of the metro mayors ultimately constrain their executive authority and autonomy. This plays out in two ways. One, some metro mayors are reluctant to take on responsibilities that are more contentious, e.g. statutory spatial planning powers. Two, in some areas where they have powers, e.g. to introduce a congestion charge, or a charging low emission zone, or a mayoral development corporation, they are reluctant to use those powers because of the risk their decision will be overturned or vetoed.
Ultimately making it more difficult for them to take on powers and make decisions that are politically tough but economically impactful.
So what needs to change? In the forthcoming English Devolution White Paper, the government should couple moves to broaden and deepen devolution in England with moves to strengthen the executive decision-making powers of mayoral combined authorities, so metro mayors go from being ‘one amongst equals’ to being ‘first amongst equals’.
Practically, this would mean moving to the London system, where the funding and strategy decisions taken by metro mayors cannot be overturned or vetoed by the MCA cabinet except in a very few circumstances. And once a decision has been taken by the metro mayor it would be binding on the constituent local authorities.
This change would give metro mayors more executive autonomy and authority in areas such as funding, planning, and transport akin to those enjoyed by the London mayor. The levels of recognition and expectation that many metro mayors already have with their voters, such an approach would help close the ‘who is in charge’ gap between what they can do and what their voters (and the government) expect them to do.
Two additional points. One, compared to international counterparts the executive authority of London mayor, and therefore the metro mayors, is relatively limited, and there is scope to go further. But one step at a time. Two, giving the metro mayors more executive authority doesn’t guarantee they will use it to prioritise growth and development. To achieve this, more executive authority needs to be coupled with stronger growth incentives. Something we’ve written about here and here.
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MICHAEL EDWARDS
The London Mayor formula may be preferable to these CA mayors but it leaves so much to be desired. It’s a role which attracts big egos but not always great democrats. Assembly is a very weak parliament and lacks the resources to do scrutiny properly so mayor, deputies and officers can charm and bully Assembly Committees. There is nowhere to discuss such matters.